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The Pinochet Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissène Habré
by Inbal Sansani*
Habré years. This Truth Commission (Commission) accused
he October 1998 arrest of former Chilean dictator
Habré’s government of “tens of thousands of political murAugusto Pinochet in London warned dictators worldders and systematic torture.” According to the Commission,
wide that international impunity for gross human rights
Habré’s National Security Service, the Direction de la Docuviolations is no longer guaranteed. The February 2000 indictmentation et de la Sécurité (DDS) carried out most of the arrests,
ment of former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré in Senegal
torture, assassinations, and large-scale massacres. Habré
confirmed that the Pinochet case was not an isolated attempt
specifically targeted various ethnic groups in Chad, such as
at forcing accountability, but that victims of human rights
the Sara, Hadjerai, and the Zaghawa on the alleged basis that
abuses would indeed use the Pinochet example to seek justice
they posed a threat to his rule. Under his rule, the DDS
against their perpetrators. Although Pinochet’s arrest and
killed an estimated 40,000 people and tortured an estimated
subsequent legal proceeding in the United Kingdom signaled
200,000 people.
a positive development in the operation of transnational jusAlthough the Commission recommended the immediate
tice, precarious legal and political realities remain valid conprosecution of those responsible for the Habré regime’s
cerns. The Habré case reflects this spectrum of dramatic legal
crimes, the Deby government failed to pursue its recomadvances and setbacks.
mendations because Deby and many ranking officials of his
On February 3, 2000, Dakar Regional Court (Court) in
government had executed Habré’s orders and were thus
Senegal indicted Habré, Chad’s exiled former dictator, on
involved in the crimes.
charges of being an accomplice to torture. The arrest of
Habré, now 57 years old, marked the first time an African head
Universal Jurisdiction and the Principle of Aut Dedere Aut
of state had been indicted by the Court of another African
Judicare
country. The elation felt by the victims surrounding Habré’s
Universal jurisdiction—the authority of domestic courts to
indictment was short-lived. On July 4, 2000, in a decision
prosecute
certain crimes committed abroad by and against forheavily criticized nationally and internationally, a three-memeign
citizens—is
a facet of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It recber Indicting Chamber (Chamber) dismissed the charges
ognizes that all states must help bring to justice the perpeagainst Habré. Despite Senegal’s 1986 ratification of the UN
trators of particular crimes of international concern, no
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
matter where the crime was committed, and regardless of the
Degrading Treatment or Punishnationality of the perpetrators or
ment (CAT), which promotes the
their victims. There are four traprinciple of universal jurisdiction,
The
February
2000
indictment
of
former
ditional theories of criminal juristhe Chamber ruled that Senegalese
diction: territorial (applicable
courts did not have jurisdiction to
Chadian dictator Hissène Habré in Senegal
when a crime occurs in the prosearbitrate this controversy. The
confirmed
that
the
Pinochet
case
was
not
cuting nation’s territory); active
Chamber quashed Habré’s indictpersonality (defined by the nationan isolated attempt at forcing accountabilment on the grounds that Senegal
ality of the perpetrator); passive
was an improper venue for his trial
ity, but that victims of human rights abuses
personality (defined by the nationbecause his crimes had not been
ality of the victim); and protective
would indeed use the Pinochet example to
committed there.
(applicable when a crime violates
Habré’s prosecutors argue that
seek justice against their perpetrators.
a nation’s particular interest or
the principle of universal jurisdicsecurity). Universal jurisdiction is
tion articulated in the “no safe
an exception to international law’s
haven” provision in Article 7 of the
traditional
requirements
of
national or territorial links, and
CAT, expressly obliges states to either prosecute or extradite
is applicable to those whose criminal acts render them hostes
alleged torturers in its territory, making Senegal an appropriate
humani generis, the enemies of all humankind. Such acts
forum for this indictment. The Chamber’s decision is currently
often are committed by those who act from, or flee to, a foron appeal before the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court),
eign jurisdiction, or by those who act under the protection
Senegal’s highest court, which was expected to hear the case
of the state. Therefore, the other jurisdictional bases are
on March 6, 2001. Both the principle of universal jurisdiction
insufficient to hold such perpetrators accountable. As the only
and the Pinochet precedent dictate that Habré can and should
jurisdictional principle that does not require a nexus between
be prosecuted in Senegal, and that the Chamber’s decision to
the criminal act and the prosecuting nation, universal jurisquash his indictment should be reversed.
diction grants the broadest range of jurisdictional power.
Piracy is generally cited as the original subject of universal jurisBackground
diction. Following its extension to slave trading, the law of uniHissène Habré, also known as the “Desert Fox,” rose to
versal jurisdiction greatly expanded as a result of the postpower in Chad, a former French colony, in 1982 by overWorld War II war crimes trials. The Nuremberg Tribunal
throwing the government of Goukouni Wedeye. The United
expanded universal jurisdiction to apply to genocide, crimes
States and France provided Habré’s one-party regime with
against humanity, and war crimes.
hundreds of millions of dollars and helped train his intelliIn addition to customary international law, certain intergence service in order to maintain an anti-communist presnational treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions (for
ence in North Africa. The United States and France supexample, see Articles 146 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Conported Habré despite widespread evidence that he
vention) and the CAT (Article 7) enumerate the types of
orchestrated extensive human rights abuses, including extracrimes that give rise to universal jurisdiction. The principle of
judicial killings and torture.
aut dedere aut judicare—“either extradite or prosecute”—is
In 1990, Habré was deposed in a civil war by Chad’s curexplicitly delineated in these instruments. Pursuant to this prinrent president Idriss Deby, Habré’s former minister of defense
and military chief of staff. Habré subsequently fled Chad
and sought exile in Senegal. In 1992, Deby commissioned
continued on next page
respected jurists to investigate the human rights abuses of the
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ciple, international treaties oblige states parties to either try
or extradite those believed to have committed them. According to Senior Coordinator of the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights’ International Justice Program Bruce
Broomhall, in “ordinary usage, ‘universal jurisdiction’ encompasses both permissive and mandatory forms, where a state may
and where a state must exercise jurisdiction,” a differentiation
which “largely parallels the distinction between the doctrine’s
manifestations under customary and under conventional
international law.” Universal jurisdiction becomes mandatory once a state ratifies or accedes to a treaty that mandates
it, like the Geneva Conventions or the CAT. Permissible universal jurisdiction is more sweeping; it is exercised as a matter of custom, rather than only as a party to a convention.
The interpretation of universal jurisdiction of the state in
which such a case is brought will ultimately decide whether
a prosecution may proceed. The doctrine’s inherent reliance
on national authorities to enforce international norms makes
its application difficult. Broomhall asserts that because
national courts exercising universal jurisdiction are endowed
with the “de facto status of agents of the international community,” pivotal decisions may reflect domestic decisionmakers’ calculations regarding justice, the national interest,
and other criteria. Indeed, government interference with
the judiciary in the Habré case, which the Union of Senegalese
Judges deplored as “repeated violations” of the Constitution
and Senegalese law, suggests that the government forced
the judiciary to act with a political agenda.
Application of Universal Jurisdiction in Pinochet
The authority of the Spanish judge Báltazar Garzón to
order Pinochet’s arrest on the grounds of universal jurisdiction was a striking feature of the Pinochet controversy. Spain’s
arrest of Pinochet was grounded in a domestic statute incorporating the principle of universal jurisdiction. Specifically,
the Spanish courts validated their jurisdiction on Article 23.4
of the Spanish Judicial Law, which allows prosecution of

This Truth Commission (Commission)
accused Habré’s government of “tens of
thousands of political murders and
systematic torture.”
non-Spanish citizens for certain crimes committed outside
Spain, among them genocide, terrorism, and other crimes
under international law contained in treaties ratified by
Spain. The Spanish courts considered three factors: the relevant legislation passage dates; whether the legislation was substantive or procedural and thus applicable to conduct occurring before its passage; and its relationship to an earlier
Spanish law allowing for extraterritorial prosecutions.
Although the Spanish courts discussed universal jurisdiction, they ultimately grounded their decision in the domestic statute. Judge Garzón requested the United Kingdom
arrest and extradite Pinochet to Spain when he arrived in
London for medical treatment. In Britain, the House of
Lords’ grounds for jurisdiction over Pinochet relied on
nationally implemented legislation of the CAT, which provided for universal jurisdiction. The House of Lords determined that torture could only be considered an extraditable
crime after the U.K.’s 1988 ratification of the CAT. It was the
incorporation of Article 7 of the CAT into the U.K.’s domes-
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Chadian plaintiffs with their supporters and Senegalese
lawyers at the Dakar courthouse after giving testimony against
Hissène Habré, January 2000.

tic law, not the underlying customary law norm, which granted
jurisdiction over Pinochet. Senegal’s signatory status to the
CAT suggests that its national courts have comparable power.
Legal and Political Trials in Senegal
Genesis of the Case
In early 1999, Delphine Djiraibe, President of the Chadian
Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights,
requested the assistance of Human Rights Watch (HRW) in
bringing Habré to justice in Senegal. Although Senegal has
served as Habré’s “safe haven” since his exile from Chad, Senegal’s ratification of the CAT and other major human rights
treaties, as well as its democratic tradition and relatively independent judiciary, suggested that it could be a promising host
for a successful prosecution. An investigation by international and domestic researchers ensued in Chad, and a coalition of Chadian, African, and international human rights
groups were organized to support the private criminal complaint. The group included the Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime (AVCRP); the Dakarbased African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights; the
Chadian League for Human Rights; the Senegalese National
Organization for Human Rights; the London-based Interights;
the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues; and
the French organization Agir Ensemble pour les Droits de l’Homme.
The representatives of the participating organizations chartered the International Committee for the Trial of Hissène
Habré to assure the victims’ continuous legal representation, witness protection, and domestic and international
public support.
On January 26, 2000, the AVCRP and seven individual Chadians officially accused Habré of being an accomplice to torture, barbarous acts, and crimes against humanity in the
Dakar Regional Court. The torture charge was grounded in
Senegal’s 1986 ratification of the CAT, the “barbarity” charges
were based on a Senegalese statute, and customary international law supported the coalition’s demand that Senegal
fulfill its obligation to prosecute those accused of crimes
against humanity. AVCRP files detailing 97 political killings,
142 cases of torture, 100 “disappearances,” and 736 arbitrary
arrests, a 1992 report by a French medical team on torture
under Habré’s regime, and the 1992 Commission report,
support the charges in the complaint. Investigating Judge
Demba Kandji then sought the advice of state prosecutor
Abdulaye Gaye, who offered his formal approval to Habré’s
prosecution on January 28, 2000. Gaye’s quick response
reflected the plaintiffs’ urgency that Habré be taken into
continued on next page
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custody or have his presence legally ensured according to Article 6 of the CAT. The plaintiffs sought to prevent Habré’s
flight from Senegal and to allow a judge to hear their testimony before they returned to Chad.
On February 3, 2000, after hearing the testimony of six of
Habré’s victims and receiving information regarding hundreds
of other crimes, Judge Kandji summoned Habré to the Court
and indicted him on charges of accomplice to torture and
placed him under virtual house arrest. A judicial order
restricted Habré’s movements to the two Dakar zones where
he has houses, barred him from making public declarations,
required him to report to a police post weekly, and ordered
the confiscation of his firearms and passport. Further, Judge
Kandji also commenced an investigation against persons to
be named later for crimes against humanity, disappearances,
and barbarous acts, reserving the potential to indict Habré
or others on these charges.

34

power specifically extended to it by the Senegalese legislature.
The Chamber’s decision suggests that the CAT’s implementation into national law is incomplete. Further, they argued
that the 1986 CAT provisions, and the 1996 Senegalese implementing legislation, could not be applied retroactively. Senegal ratified the CAT on June 26, 1987. Most of the crimes
alleged in the complaint against Habré were committed after
1987. Hence, if the Chamber allowed universal jurisdiction
on the ground of Senegal’s CAT commitment, this alone
would allow Habré’s indictment.
This argument highlighted the constitutional obligation
of Senegal to adhere to the CAT once the legislature ratified
it. Finally, the victims’ lawyers answered Habré’s statute of limitations claim by arguing that pursuant to Article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a ten-year statute of limitations for
serious crimes applies to the case. The prosecution further
argued that, according to Senegalese law, the statute of limitations count only began once prosecution became possible.
Therefore, Habré’s prosecution could only begin when he fell
from power on December 1, 1990. The January 2000 commencement of the case occurred less than ten years later.

Habré’s Motion to Dismiss
While Judge Kandji continued his investigation into the
Political Interference in the Judicial Process
case, on February 18, 2000, Habré’s lawyers filed a motion to
The initially rapid progression of the case stalled in March
dismiss the case before the Indicting Chamber of Dakar’s
under newly-elected Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade.
Court of Appeals. His defense team asserted three claims. First,
Wade’s victory was considered a revitalization of Senegal’s
Habré’s lawyers argued that under Senegalese law, Senedemocracy because it ended forty years of one party rule. Howgalese courts do not have the power to adjudicate crimes comever, it would negatively impact the victims’ case against
mitted in Chad. Habré’s lawyers cited Article 669 of the
Habré. A conflict of interest emerged when President Wade
Criminal Procedure Code, which delineates that “Senegal’s
appointed Habré’s attorney, Madické Niang, as his special adviextraterritorial competence over foreigners was limited to .
sor on judicial matters, while Niang continued to defend
. . crimes against state security and counterfeiting of the
Habré. Niang advised the presinational seal or official currency.”
dent on legal affairs as he continSecond, Habré’s defense conued to argue the indictment
tended that crimes committed
On February 3, 2000, after hearing the
against his client should be
prior to Senegal’s 1986 ratification
testimony of six of Habré’s victims and
quashed. In May 2000, the assisof the CAT could not be prosetant state prosecutor, François
cuted because the implementing
receiving information regarding hundreds
Diouf, joined Habré’s motion for
legislation that followed in 1996
of other crimes, Judge Kandji summoned
dismissal.
did not expand the courts’ jurisIn May 2000, another 53 Chadictional power to torture comHabré to the Court and indicted him on
dian victims, as well as a French
mitted abroad. By asserting these
charges of accomplice to torture and
woman whose Chadian husband
claims, Habré tested the Chamber’s
had been murdered in 1984,
resolution to indict him. Third,
placed him under virtual house arrest.
joined the original plaintiffs. On
Habré’s lawyers argued the proseMay 16, 2000, both parties and the
cution was barred by a three-year
state prosecutor presented argustatute of limitations for minor offenses. Habré’s defense
ments to Dakar’s three-judge Indicting Chamber on Habré’s
team characterized his alleged crimes as “minor” in order to
request to dismiss the case. The judgment of the Indicting
assert that a three-year statute of limitations applied rather
Chamber was originally expected on June 15, but was postthan the ten-year statute of limitations for “serious” crimes.
poned until July 4, 2000. On June 30, a few days before the
Indicting Chamber delivered its opinion, the Superior CounResponse to Motion to Dismiss
cil of the Magistracy hastily convened a meeting presided by
In response to Habré’s first claim that Senegal may not
President Wade and his minister of justice. At the meeting,
exercise jurisdiction over him, the victims’ lawyers asserted the
Judge Kandji was transferred from his post as chief investi“no safe haven” provisions embodied in Articles 5-7 of the CAT
gating judge of the Dakar Regional Court—and the Habré
expressly oblige Senegal to either prosecute or extradite
investigation—to become assistant state prosecutor at the
Habré. The prosecution emphasized Senegal’s right to exerDakar Court of Appeals. According to Reed Brody, Advocacy
cise jurisdiction over Habré, as well as its duty to do so as a
Director of HRW, there is no doubt that Judge Kandji’s transState Party to the CAT, regardless of the breadth of national
fer was a reprisal for his handling of the Habré case, and “a
legislation. The prosecutors answered Habré’s second claim
way for the government to block [his] continuing probe.”
about implementing legislation necessary to institute the
Judge Kandji’s removal foreshadowed the Indicting ChamCAT provisions in the national code by citing the express
ber’s decision.
terms of Article 79 of the Senegalese constitution, allowing
international treaties to override Senegal’s legal code once
Dismissal of Charges
they are ratified. The Chamber could have asserted universal
On July 4, 2000, the Indicting Chamber dismissed the
jurisdiction over Habré on the ground that Senegal had ratcharges against Habré on the ground that Senegal was an
ified the CAT, and, therefore, was bound as a State Party to
improper venue for his prosecution because his crimes had
extradite him to another country or to prosecute him in
Senegal. Although Senegal did not enter any reservations to
continued on next page
the CAT, the Chamber decided to rule in accord with the
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position. Court President Mireille Ndiaye announced a decision would be rendered on March 20, 2001.**

Chad, continued from previous page

not been committed there. The court held it did not need to
entertain Habré’s two additional claims. Despite the requirement of aut dedere aut judicare clearly expressed in Article 7
of the CAT, the Indicting Chamber focused on Article 5,
which provides that states adopt legislation establishing the
right to adjudicate controversies of extraterritorial torture. The
Indicting Chamber’s emphasis on Article 5 allowed it to
reject Senegal’s CAT obligations on the premise that the
extent of the implementing legislation prevailed over ratification of international covenants. The Indicting Chamber distinguished a previous Cour de Cassation decision, Abdulaye
Barry c/ Biscuiterie de Medina, involving administrative law,
which subordinated national law to an international treaty on
the ground that criminal law operates under stricter rules. The
Indicting Chamber rejected the victims’ assertion that Article 79 of the Senegalese constitution grants Senegal jurisdiction over Habré because of its 1986 ratification of the
CAT. Since Senegal’s power to prosecute Habré would have
been based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, as it is
embodied in the CAT, the Indicting Chamber’s restriction on
the CAT’s applicability to Habré’s case prevented the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
On February 2001, the state prosecutor, Aly Ciré Ba, argued
before the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation that the
charges against Habré should be reinstated. Contrary to the
assistant state prosecutor François Diout’s support of Habré’s
request for dismissal in May 2000, Ba has endorsed the victims’

Conclusion
As the first post-Pinochet case, the Habré prosecution accurately reflects both the promise and the difficulties of effectively invoking universal jurisdiction. Although the Pinochet
precedent did not introduce dramatic conceptual developments, its political aftermath was spectacular. Pinochet’s
arrest sent a strong message to former and current heads of
state accused of gross human rights violations. The arrest made
clear that the international institutionalization of impunity,
which previously sheltered heads of state from accountability, would no longer be preserved.
Senegal has the opportunity to end a former dictator’s
exile. Moreover, Senegal is poised to strengthen the Pinochet
precedent by affirming the validity of universal jurisdiction
in its prosecution of Hissène Habré. By rejecting the Indicting Chamber’s narrow interpretation of universal jurisdiction
and by sustaining the constitutional provision stating that international commitments supercede domestic legislation, the
Cour de Cassation would allow Senegal to fulfill its international
duty to extradite or prosecute alleged perpetrators of human
rights abuses. 
* Inbal Sansani is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law
and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief.
** At the time of publication, the decision had not yet been released.

Dean Grossman and WCL Students Appear Before Inter-American Court
by Dee Daniels*

T

hrough an application process with the Washington College of Law (WCL), three WCL students were selected
to accompany Claudio Grossman, Dean and Co-Director of the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,
to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Court). The
Court is located in San Jose, Costa Rica, and held its 44th regular session from November 12-25, 2000. As a member and current President of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Commission), Dean Grossman was selected to serve,
along with Professor Helio Bicudo, as a Commission delegate
for the Awas Tingni case. In that capacity, Dean Grossman
supervised the overall preparation of the case, developed
case strategy, and formulated the opening and closing statements. The Dean brought WCL students because of his desire
to advance WCL’s mission of providing students who are dedicated to human rights with the opportunity of obtaining
practical experience in human rights law.
Dean Grossman and the Commission presented to the
Court the case of the Sumo Indian Community of Awas
Tingni. The Sumo indigenous people, who are from the
North Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, suffered human rights
abuses and live in a precarious state of existence because of
the Nicaraguan Government’s failure to recognize the Awas
Tingni Community’s right to their land. The latest incidence
of this failure resulted in the Nicaraguan government unlawfully conceding their land to SOLCARSA, a South Korean
company seeking to profit from the resources in their fertile
lands. The concession resulted in SOLCARSA exploiting the
Awas Tingni land and even logging areas located outside of
the conceded area. After exhausting all domestic remedies, the
Awas Tingni Community presented a successful petition to the
Commission as to the injustices they suffered. Convinced of

the legitimacy of the claim, the Commission presented the first
indigenous land rights case before the Court.
Indigenous rights leaders from various communities in the
Americas as well as international human rights advocates constituted the majority of the Court’s audience. The most impressive component of the audience, however, was the attendance
of 23 members of the Awas Tingni Community. The majority
of community members who attended did not own birth certificates or any identification, and had never traveled outside
of their land in Nicaragua. Thus the gathering of these members outside of their home was a significant feat. The participating students were able to interact with the Awas Tingni Community members and discuss the case with Dean Grossman and
the other members of the Commission who represented the
Awas Tingni Community before the Court.
Since the Court does not allow its sessions to be televised
or videotaped for security reasons, the only way to observe a
session is by attending one. Although the WCL students had
no formal role in the hearing, observing a case is the best introduction to the Court. It provided the students with the valuable opportunity of familiarizing themselves with the jurisprudence and procedures of the Inter-American human rights
system. Dean Grossman plans on taking three more students
to observe and participate in another case that will come
before the Court in the 2001–2002 academic year. In addition
to reading the briefs and becoming knowledgeable about
the case, these students may be able to prepare witnesses and
participate in researching the legal arguments involved. 
* Dee Daniels is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law. She participated in the presentation of the Awas Tingni case
before the Court.
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